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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1323 
___________ 
 
IRVING COURTLEY JONES, 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CAMDEN CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-02398) 
District Judge:  Honorable J. William Ditter, Jr. 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 1, 2012 
Before:  CHAGARES, VANASKIE and BARRY,  
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed: October 1, 2012)                                                                                                          
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Irving Courtley Jones appeals from the order entered on January 24, 2012, which 
dismissed his complaint with prejudice.  We will affirm. 
I. 
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Jones was hired by the Camden County Board of Education (Board) as a per diem 
substitute teacher.  He worked from September 2009, until he was terminated in March 
2010, following an altercation with a student allegedly engaged in disruptive behavior.  
During the course of the altercation, a desk was overturned, landing on another student’s 
foot.  There were no injuries.  Jones was suspended for conduct unbecoming a teacher 
and thereafter terminated. 
Jones filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
alleging unlawful termination by the Board because of his race.  Jones is of African-
American descent; he asserted no additional facts in support of his claim, merely 
describing the incident that led to his termination.  The EEOC dismissed Jones’ 
complaint, reporting that it was unable to conclude a statutory violation had occurred, and 
notified Jones of his right to sue.   
Thereafter, Jones commenced this action pro se, alleging race and gender 
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
2000e-17; age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634; disability discrimination under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12117; and violation of the 
Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. The 
Board filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6).  The District Court dismissed Jones’ complaint, concluding that (1) Jones failed 
to set forth facts that would support a claim based on race, age, gender, or disability; (2) 
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Jones’ claims of age, gender, and disability discrimination were barred for failure to 
exhaust his administrative remedies; (3) Jones did not have standing to litigate an IDEA 
claim; and (4) amendment of Jones’ claims would be futile.  
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review is plenary.  See 
McMullen v. Maple Shade Twp., 643 F.3d 96, 98 (3d Cir. 2011).  We must accept as true 
all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw reasonable inferences in 
favor of the plaintiff.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Erickson v. 
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007).  To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly
III. 
, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007)). 
Jones does not present a cogent legal argument to this Court.  It is well settled that 
if an appellant fails to comply with the requirements to set forth an issue raised on appeal 
and to present an argument in support of it, “the appellant normally has abandoned and 
waived that issue on appeal and it need not be addressed by the court of appeals.”  Kost v. 
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Inst. for Scientific Info., Inc. v. 
Gordon & Breach, Sci. Publishers, Inc., 931 F.2d 1002, 1011 (3d Cir. 1991); Al-Ra’Id v. 
Ingle, 69 F.3d 28, 31 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that pro se litigants are not excepted from 
the requirements).  Accordingly, despite our liberal construction of Jones’ brief, Haines v. 
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Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), we conclude that he has waived consideration of the 
District Court’s legal analysis.1
Absent waiver, we would affirm the District Court’s analysis, supplemented in the 
following manner.  The District Court correctly concluded that (1) Jones failed to set 
forth any facts that would support a claim of discrimination under Title VII, 
 
see Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 678; see also, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (stating that 
a plaintiff must establish that he was “treated . . . less favorably than others [by his 
employer] because of a protected trait” and that the employer “had a discriminatory 
intent”) (internal quotations omitted); (2) Jones failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies for his age, gender, and disability discrimination claims, see Antol, 82 F.3d at 
1295; see also supra note 1; (3) Jones did not have standing to litigate an IDEA claim, 
see, e.g., Lawrence Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. New Jersey
                                              
1 There is one exception.  Jones is critical of the District Court’s reliance on 
Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018 (3d Cir. 1997), cited in support of its conclusion that 
Jones failed to exhaust his administrative remedies relevant to his age, gender, and 
disability discrimination claims.  Although there are cases more on point than Robinson, 
we find no error in the District Court’s conclusion.  Jones did not pursue these claims 
before the EEOC first as he was required to do.  Accordingly, the District Court properly 
dismissed these claims.  See, e.g., Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1295 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(dismissing a gender discrimination claim where the plaintiff pursued only a disability 
, 417 F.3d 368, 371 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(“[The IDEA statutory] language strongly suggests that Congress intended to provide a 
private right of action only to disabled children and their parents.”); and (4) because 
Jones made no attempt to remedy the defects in his complaint, despite notice and his 
familiarity with the pleading requirements, granting him an opportunity to amend his 
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complaint would be futile, see Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (citing Foman v. Davis
IV. 
, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
                                                                                                                                                  
discrimination claim before the EEOC).   
